Tuesday, September 21, 2010

Rights-Based Ethics

Immediately I am drawn to the argument of rights-based ethics as it seems to provide me with more substance than many of the theories we’ve discussed thus far. The reading makes multiple references to the term “self-evident” which I feel is not particularly positive terminology for the argument of Natural Rights Ethics. The term itself implies that a meaning is understood without proof. Unfortunately, and similar to many of the other theories we have discussed, I see this as a potential downfall (although not detrimental to the argument.) If moral rights were truly self-evident and God given (as Locke claims), I presume that there would not be much left for discussion in regards to how we acquire our natural rights. At first, Rand seems to provide a more rational theory to consider by agreeing with Locke, with the exception being that God is not the source of our natural rights. What’s comforting about this is the fact that on the surface, Rand not only considers this theory, (minus a God) she whole-heartedly defends it. My initial thought is if an original theory such as the one proposed by Locke can be considered and agreed with (minus the inclusion of God such as Rand suggests) then the fundamental aspects of the theory must be somewhat structurally “sound.” The only major difference between Locke and Rand is their conflicting viewpoints regarding the origination of our rights (God or natural.) The common ground shared between these two perspectives is that natural rights do exist for humans, independently of duties. In his natural rights theory Locke is suggesting (meta-ethically) that humans can live in a state of harmony with each other and the environment, with the right to pursue our own destiny. Due to the fact that this theory can be accepted by believers and non-believers of God, I feel the fundamental aspects (that we all have natural rights) are much more universal than some opposing theories.
One disagreement I have with both Locke and Rand is in regards to their claim that natural rights exist independently of duties. Although I understand the principle that a natural right (by definition) should not impose a particular duty on another, I do not understand how any right does not impose some sort of opposing duty. For example, Boss defines a liberty right as “the right to be left alone to pursue our legitimate interests.” In order for our right to be fulfilled, it would require a duty on others to not interfere with said right. I realize this is not a duty where someone is forced to do (or give) something, instead it is asking that someone not do something (interfere) which in my opinion is a duty nonetheless. I feel that as long as there is the option to interfere with the rights of another, we are obligated by duty to make the correct moral choice of not interfering. I’ll use the (liberty) right to privacy to help clarify my point. If an individual has a right to privacy (which I’m assuming we all agree with) and is pursuing their right, I (as an opposing individual) have a duty to allow that person to pursue their right without interfering.

No comments:

Post a Comment